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Front Matter (pp. I-IV) Add to My Lists Cite this Item Table of Contents (pp. V-VI) Add to My Lists Cite this Item ACKNOWLEDGMENTS (pp. VII-VIII) Add to My Lists Cite this Item INTRODUCTION (pp. IX-XVIII) This study is an exploration of an important but frequently misunderstood source of tension and instability in the Persian Gulf Arab states—the divide between Shi?a and Sunni adherents of Islam. It aims to offer an explanation for the conditions under which sectarian tensions became a prominent feature of Gulf political life, and it assesses the impact of sectarianism on the region’s domestic politics. The Shi?a–Sunni split has long perplexed scholars and observers of the Middle East, particularly since 2006. During this momentous year, the civil war in Iraq had risen to a steady crescendo of violence, and it... Add to My Lists Cite this Item List of Abbreviations (pp. XIX-XXII) Add to My Lists Cite this Item PART I. THE ROOTS OF SECTARIANISM ONE GOVERNANCE, SOCIETY, AND IDENTITY IN THE GULF (pp. 3-20) Linked together by familial ties and dynastic structures, the rulers of Arab Gulf states constitute a sort of club that is highly conservative in outlook and has proven surprisingly resilient to the ideological forces, revolutions, and coups that have buffeted the rest of the Arab world. At the regional level, these states are part of a multilateral security structure, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), that was formed in response to the 1979 Iranian Revolution. At the individual state level, security policies have typically followed a time-tested pattern: the dispersal of oil rents to placate potential opposition; the reliance on an... Add to My Lists Cite this Item TWO THE LONG SHADOW OF THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION (pp. 21-38) To understand Shi?a–Sunni relations in the post-2003 era, it is important first to examine the seminal impact of the Iranian Revolution on Gulf societies. A seismic event in Gulf political life, the Iranian Revolution and its aftermath continue to weigh heavily on sectarian relations today, acting as a lens through which domestic actors view regional events such as the Iraq War, the 2006 Lebanon War, and, less explicitly, the Arab uprisings of 2011. Gulf media, official statements, and Sunni websites draw frequent analogies between Iran’s incitement of Gulf Shi?a after 1979 and the contagion effect of Iran’s expansion of... Add to My Lists Cite this Item PART II. BAHRAIN THREE DEBATING PARTICIPATION: The Bahraini Shi?a and Regional Influences (pp. 41-57) Of the three countries under examination, none was more affected by the regional upheaval of the Iraq War than Bahrain. The collapse of the Saddam regime in Iraq and the political empowerment of Iraq Shi?a left Bahrain the only country in the Arab world where a Sunni minority rules over a Shi?a majority. The ensuing civil war in Iraq exacerbated the island’s longstanding sectarian tensions, sharpened the opposition’s critique of the regime, and put strains on Bahraini participatory institutions such as the Parliament. The dramatic, unfolding narrative in Iraq—the reemergence of Najaf as a center of Shi?a religious authority,... Add to My Lists Cite this Item FOUR SECTARIAN BALANCING: The Bahraini Sunnis and a Polarized Parliament (pp. 58-72) In the midst of the Iraq War, the ruling Al Khalifa family in Bahrain tried to institutionalize the Shi?a opposition and blunt the appeal of more rejectionist elements. At the same time, it pursued a strategy of countering Shi?a activism by sponsoring the formation of a united Sunni Islamist bloc, naturalizing foreign-born Sunnis to offset the Shi?a’s growing demographic weight, and blocking any legislation that could upset the existing balance of power. It was a dangerous sectarian strategy that ultimately weakened the social fabric of the country and fed into growing discontent—not just among Shi?a but lower-class Sunnis. A... Add to My Lists Cite this Item FIVE INTO THE ABYSS: The Pearl Roundabout Uprising and Its Aftermath (pp. 73-102) Sparked by revolts in Tunis and Cairo, the 2011 uprising in Bahrain was a watershed in the country’s political life, a major breach in the country’s already frayed social fabric. The unrest, originally cross-sectarian and populist, as well as the government’s response to it pitched the country deeper into sectarian polarization. This polarization resulted in part from deliberate government policies and in part from fissures and schisms in the opposition. As the Pearl Roundabout revolt unfolded, the regime skillfully played up sectarian tensions and the bogeyman of Iran. The protestors, despite their best efforts at trying to convey solidarity with... Add to My Lists Cite this Item PART III. SAUDI ARABIA SIX LOYALTIES UNDER FIRE: The Saudi Shi?a in the Shadow of Iraq (pp. 105-121) Shi?a–state relations in Saudi Arabia are distinguished from those in Bahrain by demographics, economic resources, regime type, and strategic geography. First, the Shi?a of Saudi Arabia constitute only 10 to 15 percent of the total population, meaning that political reforms do not carry the implicit threat of a Shi?a takeover, as they do in Bahrain.¹ As noted in chapter 1, the Saudi Shi?a enjoy more economic advantages and a higher standard of living than their Bahraini counterparts but suffer from greater religious discrimination stemming from the monarchy’s alliance with the Salafi clerical establishment. Unlike Bahrain and Kuwait, there are... Add to My Lists Cite this Item SEVEN UNDER SIEGE: The Salafi and Regime Countermobilization (pp. 122-136) From 2003 onward, the Saudi regime’s strategy toward domestic Shi?a activism was influenced by a convergence of domestic vulnerabilities and regional threats: the ruling family’s symbiotic relationship with the Salafi establishment, which was doctrinally opposed to Shi?ism, and the kingdom’s geostrategy rivalry with Iran. These influences were apparent in two areas. First, the initial invasion of Iraq raised the specter of Shi?a mobilization in Saudi Arabia to a degree that was not found in Bahrain and Kuwait. The Saudi Shi?a are concentrated in the oil-rich Eastern Province, so in the run-up to the war there was growing fear in Saudi... Add to My Lists Cite this Item EIGHT WAVING ?UTHMAN’S SHIRT: Saudi Arabia’s Sectarian Spring (pp. 137-156) In October 2011, an editorial appeared in the Saudi dailyal-Hayatthat invoked the specter of Iranian meddling to argue, in unusually strident language, for harsher measures against Shi?a protests in the Eastern Province: “It is time to admit that there are fighting groups in Qatif that have been trained in Iran, Syria, and Lebanon, and to start liquidating and purging them from the country rather than listening to the deceit of those who raise slogans such as ‘rejecting sectarianism’ in the same way as ‘?Uthman’s Shirt’ to violate the country’s security.”¹ As Muslims and students of Islamic history know,... Add to My Lists Cite this Item PART IV. KUWAIT NINE RENEGOTIATING A RULING BARGAIN: The Kuwaiti Shi?a (pp. 159-173) As in the case of Saudi Arabia, Kuwaiti Shi?a have frequently been subjected to pressure and hostility from hard-line Sunni Islamists, in particular the Salafi figures who came to dominate the political opposition starting in 2008. Regional events such as the Iraq War, Hizballah’s rise in Lebanon, and growing fears over Iran exacerbated this tension in Kuwait, stirring Sunni alarm over Shi?a ascendency. In the post-2003 era, the greatest threat to Kuwaiti stability and a major enabler of sectarianism came not from Shi?a political or economic marginalization, but from Sunni tribes and Salafis, who felt excluded from the urban “center”... Add to My Lists Cite this Item TEN TILTING TOWARD REPRESSION: The Sunni Opposition and the Kuwaiti Regime (pp. 174-191) The Kuwaiti regime’s response to Shi?a activism followed a pattern employed elsewhere in the Gulf—using calibrated reforms to placate Shi?a dissent, while at the same time trying to avoid provoking Sunni Islamist sensibilities. In Kuwait, this game of sectarian balancing had higher stakes, particularly since elements of the royal family were confronted with a more concerted opposition from tribal Sunnis, starting in 2005. During this period, the Sunni tribes effectively withdrew from their previous alliance with the royalty, supplanting the liberals as the Al Sabah’s main adversary. For these oppositionists—many of thembadudrawn from the environs outside... Add to My Lists Cite this Item ELEVEN A BALANCING ACT GOES AWRY: Sectarianism and Kuwait’s Mass Protests (pp. 192-206) By late 2010, Kuwait’s Parliament had become increasingly rife with tension, and its much-heralded civic and media freedoms greatly curtailed. Old fissures reappeared in even sharper contrast;hadharandbaduvitriol had reached new levels, and conservative Islamists were seeking to implement more conservative social legislation. In response, the regime implemented a far-reaching set of media restrictions intended to temper and mitigate sectarian tensions. When the Arab uprisings in 2011 finally crashed over Kuwait, these preexisting fissures widened. A youthful protest movement within Kuwait gained steam. Sectarian tensions increased as parliamentarians and citizens took increasingly partisan positions toward the uprising... Add to My Lists Cite this Item CONCLUSIO

Beginning with the 2003 invasion of Iraq and concluding with the aftermath of the 2011 Arab uprisings, Frederic M. Wehrey investigates the roots of the Shi’a-Sunni divide now dominating the Persian Gulf's political landscape. Focusing on three Gulf states affected most by sectarian tensions–Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait—Wehrey identifies the factors that have exacerbated or tempered sectarianism, including domestic political institutions, the media, clerical establishments, and the contagion effect of external regional events, such as the Iraq war, the 2006 Lebanon conflict, the Arab uprisings, and Syria's civil war. In addition to his analysis, Wehrey builds a historical narrative of Shi’a activism in the Arab Gulf since 2003, linking regional events to the development of local Shi’a strategies and attitudes toward citizenship, political reform, and transnational identity. He finds that, while the Gulf Shi’a were inspired by their coreligionists in Iraq, Iran, and Lebanon, they ultimately pursued greater rights through a nonsectarian, nationalist approach. He also discovers that sectarianism in the region has largely been the product of the institutional weaknesses of Gulf states, leading to excessive alarm by entrenched Sunni elites and calculated attempts by regimes to discredit Shi’a political actors as proxies for Iran, Iraq, or Lebanese Hezbollah. Wehrey conducts interviews with nearly every major Shi’a leader, opinion shaper, and activist in the Gulf Arab states, as well as prominent Sunni voices, and consults diverse Arabic-language sources